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 What is the source of aesthetic knowledge?  Empirical knowledge, it is generally 
held, bottoms out in perception.  Such knowledge can be transmitted to others through 
testimony, preserved by memory, and amplified via inference.  But there would be no 
such knowledge in the first place without perception; it is where the rubber hits the 
road.  What about aesthetic knowledge?  Does it too bottom out in perception?  Is it 
those very perceptual states that ultimately justify our empirical beliefs that also ground 
aesthetic knowledge?  Most say “yes”; we will call them Perceptualists.1  But 
Perceptualism is wrong.  When it comes to aesthetic knowledge, it is appreciation, not 
perception, where the rubber hits the road.  Aesthetic knowledge, we argue, derives 
ultimately from feeling; it is a kind of affective knowledge.2  This is Affectivism.  In what 
follows, we articulate and defend a conception of affective knowledge and reveal 
aesthetic knowledge to be a species of the genus.  
 
1 This view is so ubiquitous that it is often regarded as a “truism” (Livingston 2003) or 
as “the ‘Perceptual Requirement’ in aesthetic epistemology” (Schellekens 2019:22). 
Among the many Perceptualists, see Walton (1970) and (1993), Tormey (1973), Stokes 
(2014) and (2018), as well as Hopkins (2006) and Lord (2019), both of whom we discuss 
below.  
2 Goffin (2018) also argues for a version of Affectivism but is blocked from the proper 
account of aesthetic knowledge by his failure to identify the rational structure of the 
emotions. 
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The virtues of Affectivism will be demonstrated in its solution to a thorny 
problem that has bedeviled aesthetic epistemologists: how to reconcile the seemingly 
direct character of aesthetic knowledge with the way we acquire knowledge from 
criticism.  One learns from criticism, we argue, when it guides one’s engagement with an 
object so that one can appreciate it in virtue of those of its features that render it worthy 
of appreciation; that is, when this affective guidance happens in virtue of criticism’s 
rational character.  There is, nonetheless, an important analogy between the 
fundamental roles that perception and appreciation play in knowledge-acquisition in 
their respective domains, a fact that helps to explain the appeal of Perceptualism.  Using 
(what we call) the Paradox of Aesthetic Criticism as our lodestar, we will show that 
aesthetic knowledge bottoms out in appreciation. 
Before we begin, a terminological clarification: our target in this essay is a 
contemporary aesthetic doctrine that we label Perceptualism.  But we do not challenge 
the long tradition—dating back to at least the 18th century—of thinking about aesthetic 
knowledge as perceptual in a broader sense.3  Those 18th-century thinkers who held that 
aesthetic knowledge is a matter of feeling called this knowledge aesthetic because they 
regarded knowledge acquired from feeling as experiential and direct.  This is precisely 
our view.  Perceptualism, by contrast, conceives of such knowledge as perceptual in a 
 
3 More recently, James Shelley describes himself as a ‘Perceptualist’, but unlike those we 
call Perceptualists in this paper, he also uses the term in the broader sense (see his 
2003, 2004).  Similarly, though in a different context, when McDowell (1978) argues 
that one can perceive moral requirements, he too employs a broad sense of ‘perceptual’, 
one on which a perceptual state can be (indivisibly) both receptive and conative.   
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narrow sense, and so as excluding the conative and the affective.  We use the term 
‘perception’ and its cognates to refer to these non-affective and non-conative receptive 
states.  On the view we will defend, primary aesthetically knowledge (as we will call it) is 
constituted by a distinctive sort of feeling, by (aesthetic) appreciation.  This is not to 
deny that one can possess aesthetic knowledge in virtue of a justified belief.  But such 
doxastic knowledge of the aesthetic is parasitic on primary aesthetic knowledge.  
Perceptualists take themselves to be heirs to the 18th-century tradition, but we claim this 
honorific for ourselves.   
 
I.  The Paradox of Aesthetic Criticism   
 
 The Paradox of Aesthetic Criticism (as we call it) involves a tension between the 
(seemingly) first-handed, immediate character of aesthetic knowledge on the one hand, 
and the (apparent) epistemic function of criticism on the other.4  Aesthetic knowledge is 
widely held to be direct: it arises from an experience of the object, but not by way of any 
rational transition from such experience. 5  But knowledge that arises from critical 
instruction would seem to be derived via reflection from a critical text.  Thus, it cannot 
be a matter of one’s immediate response to the aesthetic object.  To resolve the Paradox, 
 
4 See Hopkins (2006) and Lord (2019) for extensive discussion. 
5 See Livingston (2003), Schellekens and Goldie (2008), and Schellekens (2019).  For 
disagreement, see Dorsch (2013). The underlying intuition has been defended under a 
variety of headings, e.g., in terms of principles such as Autonomy (e.g., Hopkins (2001) 
and Nguyen (2020)) and Acquaintance (e.g., Wollheim (1980:3) and Tormey (1973)).  
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one must articulate the immediacy of the knowledge afforded by aesthetic experience in 
a manner consistent with the power of good criticism to instruct.  We formulate the 
Paradox as follows:  
 
Directness: Direct experience is the only source of aesthetic 
knowledge.       
Criticism:  Aesthetic criticism is, in virtue of its rational character, a 
source of aesthetic knowledge.   
 
In this section, we will diagnose the failure of two prominent approaches to the 
Paradox as an inevitable byproduct of their shared Perceptualist assumption about 
aesthetic knowledge.  To see the basic difficulty, we’ll discuss the tension between 
Directness and Criticism in a little more detail.   
Directness raises a serious challenge for any account of criticism for two closely 
related reasons. First, critics do not pronounce mere verdicts about the excellence of the 
relevant works, but explain how these works are excellent (or not) and why they are 
excellent (or not) in the ways that they are. They point to those aspects of the works that 
not only explain what led them (the critics) to respond to these works a certain way but 
also justify these responses as correct.  Critical discussions, in other words, invoke what 
Joseph Raz calls the explanatory-normative nexus characteristic of rationality.  In the 
paradigm case, the critics, in giving the reasons that support their responses, articulate 
their aesthetic knowledge of the works.  This is what leads virtually everyone writing on 
criticism in recent years to agree that criticism is a “rational activity” (Hopkins 2003: 
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137) or a “rational enterprise” (Lord, 2019:810). At the very least, the idea that criticism 
embodies a form of rationality is “a very appealing thought” (Hopkins 2003:137), 
worthy of preservation and explanation.  Yet according to Directness, one does not 
acquire aesthetic knowledge via deduction from premises.  And so the reasoning one 
finds in aesthetic criticism cannot be inferential reasoning, in which one arrives at the 
relevant knowledge by deducing a conclusion from independently held premises.  
Furthermore, Criticism is in tension with Directness not only insofar as the 
reasoning appears to be the source of the critic’s aesthetic knowledge, but also insofar as 
it seems to be the source of the reader’s aesthetic knowledge. Criticism is, after all, not 
primarily self-expression or self-explanation, but a communicative practice directed at 
the audience.  Critics do not simply express aesthetic reasons but communicate these 
reasons as reasons for their audience to respond in similar ways.  Furthermore, critical 
instruction is not exhausted merely by prompting the reader to adopt a (thereby) 
justified belief that the aesthetic object has certain properties.  A critic shows her 
audience how and why to respond directly to the relevant works in the way that she 
does.   But wait: how can taking in the critic’s remarks be the source of direct knowledge 
of the absent artwork?  The very idea would seem to be incoherent.  If audiences arrive 
at knowledge via criticism, they must arrive at it indirectly, mediated by the argument 
and testimony of the critic.  Hence the conflict between Directness and Criticism.   
Philosophers who defend Directness from apparent conflict with Criticism often 
try to point to a special mode of rationality, one that shapes direct experience.  They 
hope to explain thereby the reasoning that underlies critics’ aesthetic knowledge and 
guides their readers’ aesthetic knowledge.  And this is the right impulse.  But those 
taking this route have heretofore assumed that the relevant direct experience is 
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perception (Hopkins 2006: 137 ff., Lord 2019: 810ff).  The resulting conception of 
aesthetic experience, as we shall now argue, is hopeless. 
Errol Lord and Robert Hopkins have each defended a version of Perceptualism.  
An examination of the weaknesses of their respective approaches reveals Perceptualists 
as caught in a dilemma: Perceptualists must, to accommodate aesthetic rationality, 
either deny that aesthetic reasons operate via the subject’s responsiveness to them or 
locate rational responsiveness inside the act of perception itself.  Lord is impaled on the 
first horn, which misrepresents rationality, while Hopkins is impaled on the second, 
which misrepresents perception. In the rest of this section, we explain their errors, and 
in section four, after putting on the table the Affective View, demonstrate that the 
dilemma is false.  
 According to Lord’s “Enrichment View,” the justificatory structure of inference, 
the paradigmatic rational act, is mirrored by the justificatory relation between low-level 
contents of perception—what can be simply seen, as one might put it—and high-level 
aesthetic contents of perception.  Specifically, the aesthetic content of a perceptual 
experience is rationally justified by the justificatory status of its lower-level content.  As 
he puts it: “the justification one gets from an aesthetic perception is dependent on one’s 
justification to believe that the object has various features that indicate or ground the 
aesthetic features” (Lord, 2019: 830). What distinguishes this form of rationality from 
inference is partly that a subject, who, to use Lord’s example, believes that Olympia is 
intense on the basis of seeing the painting, need have no inkling of the justificatory 
connection between the perception of the lower-level properties and the perception of 
intensity: 
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…[the] justificatory power of his perception of the intensity is 
dependent on his ex-ante justification for believing certain claims about 
Olympia’s corresponding features (in my analysis this has to do with 
the facial expressions and their relations). To be clear, the Enrichment 
View does not predict that Alexander infers that the painting is intense 
from the claims about the corresponding features. It doesn’t even 
require that Alexander believe the claims about the corresponding 
features. It does maintain, though, that Alexander be ex-ante justified 
to believe those claims. This justification is provided by his perceptual 
experience of the features. (Lord, 2019:831)  
The job of the critic, on Lord’s view, is then to point out precisely those lower-
level features on which our aesthetic perceptions depend: 
When all goes well, one ends up with justified judgments that are 
epistemically dependent on ex-ante justification to believe the 
corresponding feature contents. By pointing out the corresponding 
features in just the right way, the critic both elucidates the structure of 
her justification and points the consumer towards the features one 
needs to process in order to see the aesthetic features for oneself. This, I 
contend, is exactly the sort of ‘perceptual proof ’ that criticism seems to 
wear on its sleeve. (Lord 2019: 831) 
To see the difficulty with this approach—analogous to the central difficulty in 
formulating an adequate view of inference in the theoretical realm—we need to return to 
the normative-explanatory nexus.  A rational explanation of belief operates by showing 
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the normative order grasp of which culminates in the relevant belief.  It is, for example, 
precisely my grasp of the fact that the butler has an alibi together with the inferential 
significance of this fact that leads me to believe that the butler is innocent. If I do not 
grasp the rational connection between his having an alibi and his innocence, and do not 
believe that he is innocent because I grasp this connection, then I do not believe that he 
is innocent for the reason that he has an alibi. Paul Boghossian calls this  
The Taking Condition: Inferring necessarily involves the thinker 
taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his 
conclusion because of that fact.6   
Lord would reject an analogous condition on aesthetic rationality for, on his view, 
one appreciates aesthetically even if one does not grasp the rational connection between 
one’s appreciation and the ground of it—in his terms, between the higher-level and the 
lower-level features: 
 
I am not claiming that one needs to have ex-post justified beliefs about the 
facial expressions in order to be ex-ante justified in believing the painting 
is intense.  That requires too much. (829)  
 
The experiencing subject, he argues, need not even “believe the claims about” (ibid.) the 
justifying features, let alone be conscious about the justificatory relation between these 
and the relevant aesthetic judgment.  As such, the perception of the higher-level content 
 
6 Boghossian (2014), 5.  This condition is first discussed in Longino (1978). 
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does not manifest the sort of rational sensitivity to justification that is the hallmark of 
genuine rationality: it fails to meet the Taking Condition.  This is not by itself an 
objection to Lord’s theory of the relation between lower-level percepti0n and aesthetic 
perception.  It is rather an objection to Lord’s claim that this relation is rational, and to 
his subsequent claim that critics, in virtue of making this relation explicit, are making 
rational connections explicit.7   
 Lord might respond by pointing out that nothing precludes him from adopting 
the thesis that the aesthetic judgment that the painting is intense is based on the 
perception of the relevant lower-level features in the fulsome sense suggested by the 
Taking Condition.  His claim is just that the perception that the painting is intense is not 
based on perception of those features (although it is epistemically dependent on them).  
But part of his stated aim is to elucidate the nature of aesthetic justification, the sort of 
thing that critics make explicit.  If Lord were to concede that critical judgments 
incorporate a kind of basing, he would thereby have admitted that the Enrichment 
account does not do the job that it is supposed to do.  Perceptualism itself would have no 
hand in resolving the Paradox of Aesthetic Criticism—unless he were to argue that 
perception itself does contain something like an inference, in which case he would 
impale himself on the Hopkins horn of the dilemma.  Barring horn-switching, the 
burden of resolving the Paradox would have been shifted to the theory that elucidates 
the nature of our non-perceptual, Taking-like responsiveness to aesthetic reasons in 
judgment (and does so in a manner that is consistent with Directness). 
 
7 Lord seems to think Taking leads to regress (see Lord forthcoming, 5), but that’s not 
so.  See Marcus 2021, ch. 5. 
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 Lord is more naturally positioned simply to reject the idea that aesthetic 
justification requires this more demanding sort of rational responsiveness.  After all, he 
holds that the Enrichment view is correct about other domains of higher-level 
perception and would argue that this provides a good reason to extend it to the aesthetic 
realm.  Why think that aesthetic judgment requires anything like basing, rather than a 
less demanding form of epistemic dependence?  This suggestion might be bolstered by 
the observation that there are plenty of kinds of epistemic dependence that do not 
require any such thing.  For example, my justification for believing that I have lived my 
entire life on Earth is dependent on my not being a brain in a vat on Venus, but this 
belief is not based on my not being a brain in a vat on Venus.   
  However, this rejoinder will not work.  To see why, note first that the more 
demanding requirement holds not only of the relation between premises and 
conclusions of inference but also of the relation between the objects of the emotions and 
the emotions themselves.  Consider, e.g., Kaito, who is angry at his mother.  We ask why 
he is angry.  Among those answers we would accept, some satisfy by giving an ordinary 
causal explanation, e.g., he’s angry at his mother because he only slept for two hours last 
night.  This answer gives an explanation that does not depend on his knowledge of the 
explanandum, i.e., of his recognizing that his sleep deficit contributes to his anger.  The 
relation between Kaito’s insomnia and his anger figures nowhere in Kaito’s experience, 
and so, per (the affective analogue to) Taking, it cannot be part of the rational 
explanation of his anger.  Now consider the following explanation: Kaito is angry at her 
because she singed his toast.  This answer is not compatible with his being oblivious to 
its being singed.  Insofar as the toast being singed rationally explains his anger, this fact 
is what he is angry about.  And to have singed toast as the object of one’s anger is to view 
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the toast’s being singed as a reason to be angry at the one responsible.  Kaito’s anger is 
rationally explained by the toast being singed only insofar as he experiences his anger as 
warranted by that very fact.  It is not enough that the toast’s being singed confers upon 
him ex-ante justification for being angry at his mother.  Were he oblivious to its being 
singed, if this did not figure in his experience, it could not be what he is actually angry 
about, but only what he would be justified in being angry about in the event that he 
learns of it.   
The relation between aesthetic judgment and its grounds has the same structure: 
to say that someone finds a work beautiful because R, where this is a rational 
explanation, is to say that R is something that this person likes about the work.  It is not 
enough that the work’s being R confers upon her ex-ante justification for finding it 
beautiful.  For that by itself does not secure that R is what she actually likes about it. 
Nor is it enough that she was led to find it beautiful by having R pointed out to her.  So 
long as she does not experience the beauty of the work as based on R, it is not what she 
likes about it and so cannot rationally explain her appreciation.  To secure that, she 
must experience R as contributing to the beauty of the relevant work.  For that reason, 
Alexander (in Lord’s example) can’t judge the painting to be intense because (in the 
rational sense) of the facial expressions if he’s oblivious to those expressions or if he 
does not experience the facial expression as contributing to the painting’s intensity.    
It might be objected that, even if it’s not precisely like rationality in other 
domains, it is close enough.  And indeed, if this were the closest we could come to 
genuine rationality in the aesthetic realm, we could console ourselves with the ersatz 
rationality that Lord offers us.  But the genuine article is, as we shall see, very much a 
live option.  There is no need to settle. 
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Importantly, neither Taking nor its analogues require that the subject be able to 
articulate either the reason for her judgment or its rational significance.  We suspect 
that a confusion about this is behind Lord’s thought that it would “require too much” for 
seeing the painting as intense because of the facial expressions that one has “ex-post 
justification about the facial expressions” (829).  He means to respect the fact that we 
are often incapable of articulating why we love the works we do.  This is true and 
important.  But there is much that figures in one’s experience and which is thus eligible 
to be part of a rational-causal explanation of feeling that one cannot quite articulate.  In 
fact, it is, we would argue, crucial to a proper account of aesthetic criticism that it allow 
for precisely this possibility.  It is a common phenomenon that one goes to see a film 
and is troubled by something but can’t say exactly what it is.  One may then read various 
reviews that specify something troubling about the film.  About some, one says “nope, 
that’s not it.” Finally, one reads the piece that illuminates what troubles one.  “That’s it!”  
No one else is in a position to say this, since what troubles one is not part of anyone 
else’s experience.  This is what we mean by saying that the rational significance of one’s 
aesthetic reasons must be part of one’s experience. Otherwise, one would not be in a 
position to say “That’s it!”.  Rational sensitivity to theoretical, practical, and 
affective/aesthetic considerations does not require that a subject be fully ready to 
articulate the rational connection between her belief, action, or emotion/appreciation 
and what lends support to it.  But still, the connection must have an inchoate presence 
in her mental life. Otherwise, she does not believe, act, or feel/appreciate for that 
reason.  
There is nonetheless something importantly right in Lord’s conception of 
criticism.  Criticism, according to Lord, points to what makes an artwork beautiful (or 
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intense or…) and makes explicit the critic’s justification for making the aesthetic 
judgments she does.  But this insight is distorted by Lord’s commitment to 
Perceptualism.  We will make good on the insight below. 
What about Hopkins?  The nub of Hopkins’ proposal is that aesthetic 
perception incorporates [an] argument….[T]he overall perception will 
include the relation between those premise-perceptions and the 
conclusion.  That is, seeing the daintiness moves one to see the 
prissiness, and not just as a factor external to the perception.  The 
prissiness one sees is presented in perception, as a consequence in part 
of the daintiness.8  
Hopkins’s inclusion of the “argument” inside perception shows that, unlike Lord, he 
recognizes the centrality of something analogous to Taking as central to genuine 
rationality.9  And so he worries—and is right to worry—about whether the transition 
between the perception of daintiness and the perception of prissiness is genuinely 
rational, rather than a matter of “mere causal connections” (Hopkins 2003:152). But he 
isn’t worried enough.  
The core difficulty is connected to the mismatch between perception and the 
rational basing relation, one that we will explore more fully below.  Hopkins models the 
shift that takes place upon reading criticism on aspect-perception: 
 
8 Hopkins (2006): 150 
9 Grant (2013) also seems to recognize this requirement, at least in the context of 
criticism and appreciation. But this insight is spoiled by his non-affective picture of 
appreciation. For more on his view, see Gorodeisky (2021b). 
.  
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By getting you to see these things, and to see them as organized in these 
ways, I bring you, if I’m successful, to see the deer. But the subsidiary 
perceptions do not merely serve as causes of your seeing the deer. 
Rather, they form elements in the deer-perception itself. Seeing the 
deer involves, and does not merely require as a causal condition, seeing 
the two patches near the flower as part of the flank, or seeing the 
variegated patch higher on the left as an ear. (2003:149) 
Seeing the deer as a whole, we agree, depends on seeing the patches as ears.  But 
whatever else must be said to distinguish it from a mere causal condition—and we have 
no alternative to offer here—it is not sort of connection that is distinctive of rational 
responsiveness. Why not?  Because you do not see the deer in virtue of taking seeing its 
ears to be showing that one should see the whole as the deer, that is, as warranting or 
meriting the latter.  Rather, you cause yourself to see the deer by trying to see its ears 
near the flower, etc.  Perhaps you also believe you should see the deer, in the sense that 
you believe a properly functioning visual system serves up a deer in these circumstances.  
And perhaps it is because you believe this that you try so hard and eventually succeed in 
seeing the deer.  But this still does not amount to seeing the deer precisely insofar as one 
views seeing it as what one should see in seeing the ears; one does not take seeing the 
ears as warranting seeing the dear.  Yet this is how it is with rational responsiveness in 
general and aesthetic responsiveness in particular.  One appreciates the excellence of the 
Souvenir precisely insofar as one appreciates its being moving, where the relation of the 
latter appreciation to the former appreciation is constituted by one’s recognition that its 
being moving makes the film (or helps to make it) excellent. In this case, one takes the 
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film’s being moving as warranting and meriting the appreciation of the film as 
excellent.  Aspect-perception does not exhibit rational responsiveness of this sort.   
To summarize: the rationality of aesthetic experience and criticism exemplifies a 
normative-explanatory nexus.  Perception does not comprise such a nexus and thus 
does not reflect the rationality of aesthetic experience and criticism.  Accordingly, Lords’ 
and Hopkins’ positions reflect the Perceptualist’s dilemma: in order to accommodate the 
rationality of criticism, they must either misrepresent the nature of aesthetic rationality 
by rendering the relevant rational connections as separable from the experiencing 
subject’s point of view or misrepresent the nature of perception by including within it a 
genuine act of reasoning.  
In contrast, Affectivism, as we will show, can do justice to both the direct 
character of aesthetic knowledge and the rationality of criticism.  It’s time to introduce 
this view of aesthetic knowledge and defend it.  We will do so in two steps: first, in the 
next section, we distinguish feeling from perception and characterize the distinctive 
character of affective knowledge. In section III, we then show that, given the character 
of aesthetic experience and judgment, aesthetic knowledge is a kind of affective 
knowledge, not empirical knowledge.  This analysis yields an account of aesthetic 
appreciation that shows how it incorporates the sort of rational responsiveness that 
Lord eschews and Hopkins mislocates. Equipped with this understanding of aesthetic 
knowledge, we will return, in section IV, to the Paradox of Criticism, proving Affectivism 
to be better positioned than Perceptualism to dissolve the Paradox, and better 
positioned precisely because it yields a satisfactory account of aesthetic knowledge. 
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II.  Perception and Feeling      
Aesthetic knowledge is typically considered a species of ordinary empirical knowledge, 
differing from other sorts of knowledge only in its topic: the aesthetic properties of 
objects, rather than, say, their color properties or their atomic properties.  There are 
many ways of construing this thesis, some of which would no doubt be perfectly 
congenial to our aims here.  But we will begin this section by laying out, in rough terms, 
an uncongenial construal: we will call it the empirical model of knowledge.   
 According to this model, the mark of empirical knowledge is its causal and 
justificatory dependence on perception.  If someone knows that p, where p is an 
empirical fact, then someone must have perceived that p or have learned it from 
someone who perceived that p, or inferred it from what was perceived, or from what was 
itself inferred, etc.  And it is in virtue of the very perceptual states from which our 
empirical beliefs derive that those beliefs constitute empirical knowledge.  We will call 
knowledge that is derived from perception empirical knowledge.  Our claim is that 
aesthetic knowledge is derived from affective rather than perceptual states and so is not 
empirical (in that sense).  It will thus be crucial to say what the differences between 
affective and perceptual states are.  
 We discuss two broad contrasts between affective and perceptual states, the first 
concerns the rational structure (or lack thereof) of the relevant state, and the second, its 
motivational power (or lack thereof). The rough idea is this: feelings10 (e.g., fear) present 
 
10 In this paper, we use the terms “feeling” and “emotion” interchangeably. We do not 
mean to imply that these terms as they are ordinarily used have precisely the same 
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the facts on which they are based (e.g., the approaching man is a violent criminal) as 
having a certain normative significance (e.g., the man is to-be-feared), and present them 
in a manner that engages the will.  Unlike affective states, sensory perceptions neither 
have rational bases nor as such motivate actions.   These two contrasts will be explored 
in the abstract here and developed in more detail in relation to aesthetic feeling in the 
next section.  In elucidating these differences and the intimate connection between 
them, we will begin to see how feelings can constitute a distinctive source of our 
knowledge of the world.  In paradigmatic cases, the feeling itself is knowledge of the 
normative fact (e.g., knowledge that the man is to-be-feared).  Such facts are the objects 
of affective knowledge.  The aim of this section is to put us in a position to recognize 
aesthetic knowledge as a species of affective knowledge. 
 
a. Feelings have a Rational Structure 
 
We will focus on three interrelated elements of the rational structure of feeling: 
(a) feelings are based on their objects, which (b) warrant them in the paradigmatic case.  
Regardless of whether they are in fact warranted, however, (c) they are experienced as 
warranted by their object.   
Start with basing. Perceptions are not based on the facts they present, whereas 
feelings are.  To see this, consider two kinds of defects to which an emotion is 
susceptible.  Suppose one finds oneself grieving over the loss of one’s favorite team, the 
 
extension; however, everything we say here is (we take it) true of what they both 
paradigmatically denote. 
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Tigers.  One’s grief can be (a) grounded in falsehood (if the Tigers didn’t lose) or (b) 
misplaced (if the Tigers’ loss does not warrant grief).  Suppose, by contrast, that one 
looks out onto the field and announces “the Tigers are taller than their opponents.”  The 
perceptual state one thereby gives voice to is not rationally based on the corresponding 
fact or putative fact.  Whatever else is true of the rational basing relation, it requires that 
the subject have a separate grasp of ground and grounded.  One cannot base a belief, 
emotion, action, or anything else on p, unless the relevant belief (or emotion or…) is, 
from the point of view of the subject, notionally separable from p.  When a belief (or …) 
is rationally based on p, the subject understands the belief (or…) as her own response to 
something else, where the something else is itself or by proxy an element of her mental 
life.  But when I perceive that p, there is no distinct element of my mental life to which I 
understand my perception as a response.11 
It might be doubted whether basing must always relate distinct elements of one’s 
mental life.  The point (of course) is not that one necessarily makes an error in using the 
technical term ‘basing’ to characterize the relation between someone’s perceiving 
something and the object of that perception.  But, all other things being equal, it is best 
not to use technical terms to corral items that are (in the relevant respects) 
fundamentally unlike one another.  Paradigmatically, when one’s belief (or action or 
emotion) is based on something, one can explain why one holds the belief (or...) by 
 
11 Although we will not explore the connection in detail here, we would argue that the 
underlying point is closely connected with G.E. Moore’s famous observation concerning 
perception: “when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: 
the other element is as if it were diaphanous" (1922; p.25).   
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pointing to (what one conceives of as) something else.  The relation between ground and 
grounded thus yields a rational explanation of the belief (or..), one which posits an 
asymmetric dependence of the latter on the former.  It would make no sense for the 
subject to explain why she holds the relevant belief (or…) by citing the relevant ground 
unless there were (at least from the subject’s point of view) some such separation.  
Nothing rationally explains itself.  But when I perceive that p, p is precisely what is given 
to me in perception.  Its presence in my mind is simply the perception itself: there is not 
enough space, so to speak, for the transition essential to basing.  Thus, one cannot point 
to the fact that p as one’s ‘reason for perceiving’ p.  (Hence also the difficulty of making 
sense of the phrase ‘reason for perceiving’.)  In this respect, affective states are more like 
beliefs than perceptions.12 
 Because emotions are based on rational grounds, the notion of warrant gets a 
distinctive sort of grip on the connection between an emotion and its object (e.g., 
grieving and the Tiger’s loss).  When we feel grief (or another emotion) about 
something, we are open to assessment, criticism, praise, or blame much as if we simply 
 
12 Susanna Siegel has recently (2017) argued that perception itself is rationally 
assessable.  But the disagreement between us and Seigel does not so much concern 
perception as it does the nature of rationality.  Unlike Hopkins, Siegel would reject 
including ‘the argument’ inside perception; her point is partly that rationality does not 
require Taking.  Although we cannot adjudicate this dispute here, if the view of aesthetic 
knowledge on offer in this essay is an illuminating one, then the general conception of 
rationality should to that extent be credited.   
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asserted that the relevant something was worthy of grief.  How warranted the grounded 
is in specific cases reflects on the rationality of the person who feels the emotion.  
Someone is silly to grieve the loss of their favorite team, as this overvalues the place of 
sports in human life.  Unlike, say, the death of a loved one, the Tigers’ loss does not 
warrant grieving.  
This notion of warrant does not apply to perception in part for the reason just 
discussed: where there is warrant there is space in the mind between what warrants and 
what is warranted.  But it is also because perceptual success is simply a matter of our 
sensory apparatus presenting what is indeed the case: of accuracy.  There is no question 
of whether I have reacted inappropriately.13  This helps to explain the fact that where it 
is perception itself that is deficient, it is a failure of biological equipment and not a 
failure of the perceiver.  By contrast, the question of this sort of warrant is always at 
stake when it comes to feelings and emotions.  Even if one’s grief is based on a truth (as 
when the Tigers indeed lost), there is a question of whether I have responded to it 
correctly by grieving (rather than by, say, being disappointed).   
Furthermore, this susceptibility to rational assessment is part of the experience of 
the emotion, whereas nothing of the sort is true of perception.  The sense of a feeling’s 
appropriateness is internal to the feeling itself.  To grieve about the loss of a loved one is 
to experience this loss as meriting grief.  The emotion presents its object as warranting 
itself—that very emotion—as a response.  We are crying about what is sad, laughing 
about what is funny, frightened at what is dangerous, etc. (or so it seems from the point 
of view of the emotion).  This is the internal perspective of the emotion.  A perception, 
 
13 Cf., Gregory (2018: 1066). 
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on the contrary, simply presents what is there (or so it seems from the point of view of 
the perception).  This helps to explain the fact that we do not consider a defect in my 
vision—blurriness, say—as my error.  It is easy to distance oneself from a faulty 
perception.  And although we can distance ourselves from a feeling, it’s hard. It’s hard 
because it requires us to disengage from an evaluative perspective that we ourselves find 
compelling, called for, or even obligatory—precisely because we feel the emotion and so 
feel it as merited.  If I am persuaded (to believe) that an emotion I am experiencing is 
unwarranted—say, that a joke that I find funny is in fact deeply offensive—I am at odds 
with myself.  By contrast, if my vision is blurry, my body has betrayed me.  The fact that 
feelings are affective judgments and so such as to include an evaluative assessment of 
themselves helps us to locate the source of the charge of inappropriateness for grieving 
over the Tiger’s loss: to have the emotion is therein for the subject to take their loss as 
possessing existential profundity.  This is an error of the person.  Chris curses his luck 
for his poor eyesight but feels shame that he grieves the loss of his team more than the 
loss of his mother. Rather than mere tools for measuring the world, our emotions 
measure us.14  
 
b. Feelings are Intrinsically Motivating  
We now turn to the second difference between affective and perceptual states.  It 
is widely held that to be in an affective state is already to be in what is, as such, a 
 
14 In this we are particularly inspired by Hamawaki (2006), Moran (2012) and 
Friedlander (2015). 
   
 
 22 
motivating state.15 But this is not so with perception, that is, with the sort of receptive 
state that is thought to ground empirical knowledge. 
Feelings have what is sometimes called valence: they exist on a spectrum of 
pleasurableness and painfulness.  The fact that feelings are pleasurable or painful as 
such—their valence—constitutes a link to motivation, one that has no analogue in 
 
15 A few have raised doubts about the idea that feelings are motivating, e.g., Robinson et 
al (2015), Corns (2014), and Corns and Cowan (2021)).  But their arguments establish 
only that the so-called “affective” and “motivating” sub-personal processing systems are 
two separate systems, though often working in tandem. Even if true, it does not follow 
that the emotions, which are person-level states, do not on their own motivate and 
rationalize behaviors.  What we say in this section is meant to intuitively support the 
motivating power of feelings by means of examples.  We would also argue that alleged 
counterexamples to the motivational power of feelings on the personal level introduced 
by Corns and Cown (2021) misfire insofar as (a) they target only the view that affect is 
constituted by desire, a view we reject below; (b) assume that sensory perceptions and 
feelings have analogous rational structures, a view that we refute; and (c) address 
mainly moral internalism, to which we are not committed here.  Furthermore, the fact 
that even Perceptualists about emotions accept the challenge of reconciling their view 
with the truism that emotions are intrinsically motivating (e.g., Tappolet 2016) speaks 
to its intuitiveness.  The connection is so tight that some suggest that it is part of the 
etymology of the term, going back to the “Old French ‘emouvoir,’ which means to stir 
up, itself going back to the Latin emovere, meaning to move out, remove, agitate” 
(Tappolet 2016: 47, n.1).  
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perception.  It is tricky to characterize this connection, however.  We will do so here by 
distinguishing motivation both from the mere having of reasons and from having 
conative pro-attitudes.   
To feel is not simply a matter of having and knowing oneself to have a reason to 
act, although it includes it.  To experience grief over the loss of one’s friend is to take his 
death to be grief-worthy.  The pain of his loss gives one has reason to do various things, 
for example, to take time out to reflect on his life.  Yet it’s possible to have all of the 
reasons and to know that I have these reasons, but nonetheless to lack the motivation to 
act on them.  If, for example, I simply believe that I have reasons to spend time 
reflecting on Morgan’s life, I may not act on these reasons—I may simply not feel like it. 
Nor is motivation simply a matter of possessing the desire to do it, at least insofar as one 
conceives of a desire as simply a ‘pro-attitude’ towards performing a certain action.16  A 
desire (so understood) might be a matter of holding the aforementioned belief that I 
have certain reasons to perform the action.17  Such a desire may even be associated with 
a feeling of dread about performing the relevant action. But to grieve is not merely to 
have and know that one has the reason, and so not simply to desire (in the ‘pro-attitude’ 
 
16 This conception of motivation is developed and defended at length in Marcus 
(forthcoming).  
17 The distinction between desiring to do something and believing it would be good to do 
is emphasized in, e.g., Stampe (1987).  We do not, in any case, commit ourselves to a 
‘pro-attitude’ theory of desire. For a conception of desire according to which it is 
presentational and internally evaluative, see, for example, Tenenbaum (2007) and 
Brewer (2009).  
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sense) to perform the action. Prompted by the pain of someone’s loss, one feels like 
doing the things that the reasons are reasons to do; that is, one is motivated to do those 
things.18  Perception, by contrast, does not as such supply motivation. Typically, we 
know various facts on the basis of perception, facts that, once grasped, can figure in our 
practical deliberations in various ways.  But to perceive that things are thus-and-so is 
not by itself to be motivated to respond in any particular way. 
Though emotions are unlike perceptions in their motivational power, the 
particular manner in which they motivate is inextricable from a feature they share with 
perception:  they are presentational, i.e., they present the world as being a certain way.  
Mark Johnston has argued along these lines that if affective experiences were not 
presentational, we could not account for their power either to motivate or to rationalize 
behaviors and to do so directly.   Johnston observes that “many of our affective 
responses have authority, in the sense of requiring or at least making immediately 
intelligible what we then go on to desire and do.”19 This authoritativeness is due to the 
presentational purport of feelings.  He argues that the analogy between perception and 
feeling is something like this: whereas perception, precisely insofar as it discloses the 
environment, makes our own beliefs about the world intelligible to ourselves (and so 
they are sustained by our viewing them as true), feeling, precisely insofar as it discloses 
the good, makes those feelings and consequent behaviors intelligible to ourselves: they 
 
18 The wide tendency to understand affective motivation in terms of desire is thus 
misguided. See Prinz 2004, Tappolet 2016, though with qualifications, and Corns & 
Cowans (2021). On its confusion, cf. Goldie (2000), Helm (2001).   
19 Johnston (2001): 187. 
   
 
 25 
are sustained by the continuing sensuous apprehension of the worthwhile.  It is 
precisely because emotions present the world as having certain goods that they have the 
power to both motivate and rationalize their own (dis)continuation, their 
pursuit/avoidance, etc.  I need nothing other than to be in touch with my grief to spend 
time reflecting on Morgan’s life, to visit his parents, to keep playing James Brown, etc.  
Note too that we need only cite a past or current feeling in order to rationally explain 
such behaviors.  Saying: “I am so taken back by Morgan’s death” suffices on its own both 
to articulate my motivation and to justify the time I spend listening to Star Time.  I need 
not say, and standardly don’t say in response to the question “why do you spend so 
much time in quiet reflection?” “I believe that I am grieving” or “I desire to reflect on 
Morgan’s life.” In fact, standardly such answers would be weird.  To answer this 
question aptly, I need only to cite my emotion.   
 
c. Feelings are Direct Ways of Knowing  
 
When our emotions present the world as it really is, we acquire knowledge of the 
world directly.20   We can learn from grief that a specific person’s life was important, that 
they mattered, that they were a special and irreplaceable being.  Furthermore, we do not 
 
20 Our view of the emotions thus differs both from the standard cognitivist’s view, 
according to which emotions are beliefs or judgments about values (e.g., Solomon 1993, 
Nussbaum 2001) and from perceptual theories of emotions, according to which 
emotions just are perceptions—in the narrow sense—of value (e.g., Tappolet 2016, 
Milona 2016).  
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learn this by inferential reasoning: “I feel terrible that Morgan died, so he must have 
been a special person.”  Rather, it is simply by experiencing grief that one can come to 
know that he is a special person.  Emotions are responses to facts (and events and 
objects) that present those very facts (and events and objects) as having a certain 
significance.  They present those facts (and events and objects) as warranting and 
motivating actions and mental states of various types, in addition to warranting the very 
emotion being experienced.  In the paradigm case, we know that those facts possess the 
relevant significance by experiencing the relevant emotions.  To feel grief about what 
merits grief because it merits grief is to have knowledge of, in the broad sense, value.  
This is not to say that one can’t know the significance of this person in some other way.  
One can know it from testimony or inference.  But the feeling of grief is itself a way of 
coming to know this instance of value. 
Our point is not that one feels grief and is thereby caused to believe that, e.g., 
Morgan’s death merits sadness and reflection on his life.  Rather, the feeling itself, 
which like perceptions comes upon the griever unbidden, simply presents Morgan’s 
death as worthy of grief.  Unlike the case of belief, there is no proposition, mediating 
between the emotion and the world.  Affective knowledge is in this sense non-
propositional.  But unlike knowing how to do something or knowing a person (other 
plausible candidates for non-propositional knowledge), the object of affective knowledge 
is a (normative) fact.  In this respect, it is more like practical knowledge: practical 
knowledge is factual knowledge we have not by virtue of being justified in believing a 
proposition, but rather simply by virtue of performing an intentional action: for 
example, I know that I am walking to the zoo not because I have adequate doxastic 
justification (e.g., I can smell the animals), but simply because I am intentionally 
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walking to the zoo.21  Analogously, affective knowledge is factual knowledge we have not 
by virtue of being justified in believing a proposition, but rather simply by experiencing 
a feeling.  I know that Morgan was a special person not because I have doxastic 
justification (e.g., having read the obituaries), but simply through grief.    
Is there a tension between arguing that emotions are motivating and that they are 
direct ways of knowing?  No.  To regard the emotions as motivating is not to regard 
them as non-cognitive states (as the Humean typically has it).  The emotions are not 
motivating states as opposed to being ways of knowing the world.  To assume otherwise 
is to wrongly assume an affective-cognitive divide, which we reject along with the 
affective-conative divide, and the conative-cognitive divide.  A state or experience can be 
both a way of knowing the world and motivation to act a certain way—a knowing 
feeling.22  Feelings provide excellent ground for challenging these alleged divisions, 
given that, as argued above,  their motivational and cognitive powers are 
interdependent.   
Because feeling is, in the ideal case, an awareness of a normative fact, we describe 
it as a type of judgment.  Our point in doing so is to emphasize that affective knowledge 
is not based on feeling in the way doxastic knowledge might be based on feeling—as 
when I infer that Morgan meant a lot to me from the fact that I can’t stop crying.  The 
latter is a theoretical judgment, consisting of a true belief based on good evidence.  The 
former, affective knowledge, is an affective judgment consisting simply of the feeling 
 
21 This thesis is defended at length in Marcus (2018) and Marcus (2019). 
22 Cf. Zagzebski (2003), Döring (2007), Brewer (2009): 32-34 and Helm (2001), mainly 
chapter 2.  
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itself.  As we will use the term, then, a judgment is a possible knowledge-state.  Not all 
affective judgments are knowledge, of course.   One who grieves over their team’s loss 
does not, in so doing, know that it was grief-worthy.  But when an affective judgment is 
what it should be—a feeling that presents itself as merited by its object and is felt 
because it is (actually) so merited—it constitutes affective knowledge in virtue of putting 
us in (affective) touch with a normative fact. 
 
d.  Objections and Queries  
 
Given the ultimate objectives of this paper, a full defense of the general approach 
to the emotions and to affective knowledge is not possible here.23 But consideration of 
some objections and queries will clarify and support the central idea.   
First, we ordinarily don’t speak of emotions as true or accurate, but rather as 
appropriate or inappropriate.  This might be taken as evidence that we don’t ordinarily 
conceive of emotions as tracking reality.  But in fact, part of what confers 
appropriateness on an emotion is precisely its fidelity to reality.  Its rationality is 
measured by accuracy, just not exhausted by that measure.24  If a grown man cries when 
 
23 For a fuller defense, see Gorodeisky (MS).  
24 See Gorodeisky (2021b). This is why some of those working on emotions agree that 
emotions cannot be desires if the latter are characterized by what is often known as a 
world-to-mind direction of fit (e.g., Helm (2001), Döring (2003), Raz (2011)). The point 
is that, like beliefs and doxastic judgments, the emotions are measured partly by their 
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the Tigers lose, we would (ordinarily) view him in his grief as wrongly valuing the 
outcome of football games.  His emotional response falls short of the relevant standard 
of success since it is not warranted by their loss.  Similarly, someone who flies into a 
rage at being asked by a waiter whether they want a lemon in their water finds offense 
where there was none.  We view someone who grieves at the loss of a friend, on the 
contrary, as properly registering in their grief the value of a human being.  The 
appropriateness of an emotion is a matter of its affectively presenting its object as 
possessing a significance that it really does have, and of being responsive to it.  Accuracy 
is part but not all of this.  
Second, do emotions reveal value-facts simpliciter (a man’s death is to-be-
grieved) or just value-facts for the experiencing subject (a man’s death is to be grieved 
by me)?  A complete answer to this question would require more work on the ontology 
of value than we can do here.  But we would argue that the character of disagreements 
fueled by conflicting emotions strongly suggests that emotions, on their face, present 
value facts simpliciter.  Someone who feels sympathy for a migrant child being 
separated from their parents will take someone who feels none to be both missing 
something (the tragedy) and lacking something (appropriate responsiveness to such a 
tragedy).  Even when it comes to less weighty matters, there is something slightly 
disturbing and alienating in realizing that someone else—particularly someone close—
doesn’t share one’s emotional response (“you didn’t find it funny??” “you dislike 
Hitchcock??”).  And emotions are always subject to a “why” question, one that asks not 
 
answerability to the facts: their success depends (partially) on correct reflection of the 
world.  
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only for what led you to feel that way (or to lack the feeling) but at the same time what 
justifies this feeling (or lack thereof). The best explanation of this and related 
phenomena is that, when our emotions present something as having a certain value, we 
do not understand the relevant value as merely of the ‘for me’ variety. 
As our topic is not the ontology of value, we will not consider here arguments that 
there are no values ‘out there’ as part of the fabric of reality.25  It is worth emphasizing, 
however, that our opponent in this paper, the Perceptualist, is also a realist about 
aesthetic value.  And their theory attempts to show how the aesthetic has a real foothold 
in the world.  We contend that our view accomplishes this aim without distorting the 
character of what it is supposed to explain, namely, aesthetic knowledge.  We will return 
to this point below. 
Still, it might then be wondered, thirdly, why in presenting this view of feelings a 
specific stance on the question of value realism is required and, relatedly, why the 
theory of the emotions on offer is committed to any particular story about affective 
knowledge?  Why not, it might be asked, simply introduce the notion of affective (and 
aesthetic) cognition without weighing in on any extra-mental questions? 
The short answer is that emotions are normative kinds, in the sense that part of 
what it is to be a state of, say, grief is to be measurable according to a standard.  And the 
relevant standard is to feel grief about what merits grief because it merits grief.  So grief 
is inappropriate when it is about something that does not merit grief.  But a suitable 
 
25 For arguments supporting the view that affective values, including aesthetic properties 
are not merely projected on to the world, but part of the fabric of the world, see, e.g., 
McDowell 1983, Johnston 2001.  
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match is not sufficient for an exemplary instance.  It must also be felt because its object 
is grief-worthy.   And the relevant sense of ‘because’ is that of rational explanation.  To 
revert to our earlier example, Kaito is not angry at his mother because she singed the 
toast unless he takes it that she singed the toast.  For this reason, the same strange 
possibilities that threaten our perceptual judgments (defeaters of various sorts) also 
make vulnerable our emotional responses to what is (or seems to be) learned through 
experience.  If Kaito merely speculates (but does not know) that she singed the toast 
then his anger is to that extent unjustified.  More interestingly, if (as seems fair) singed 
toast is a bad reason for anger, then his anger does not embody knowledge of the 
singing’s meriting anger.  Because grief is a normative kind, governed by the above 
standard, one cannot say what grief is without invoking the extra-mental.  It just is the 
feeling that is what it should be under specific, apprehended worldly conditions.  
Fourth, the former query and our repeated discussion of merit may raise a 
further question: what role does the appeal to meriting play in distinguishing affect 
from perception?  We answer as follows.  The rational ‘because’ means roughly ‘in light 
of the fact that…’.26  To say that a man grieves the death of his friend because it merits 
grief is to say that he reacts in light of the death’s grief-worthiness; the point of view of 
his grief includes a view of Morgan’s death as worthy of grieving.  We do not emphasize 
this merely because it accounts for a central feature of the phenomenology of feeling, 
but because a crucial element of the sort of knowledge that a feeling provides is a 
consciousness of the feeling’s own appropriateness, i.e., its being a suitable response to a 
loss.  And the emotion constitutes knowledge of grief-worthiness only if it includes a 
 
26 For extensive discussion of rational explanation, see Marcus (2012). 
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grasp (often inchoate) of the justification that the relevant circumstance actually 
provides for grieving.  Emotions are, in this sense, occupants of the space of reasons.  
Part of what it is to feel grief is to recognize the appropriateness of such questions as 
‘why grieve about him?’.  To which one might respond, as the Ghost of Christmas Future 
does to Scrooge: “It may be that, in the sight of Heaven, you are more worthless and less 
fit to live than millions like this poor man's child”.  In the exemplary case, the subject 
understands her grief (again perhaps inchoately) as justified by a state of affairs that in 
reality does justify her grief.  The internal perspective of the emotion is thus itself 
evaluative, and it is partly in virtue of the correctness of the evaluation that the emotion 
is at the same time knowledge of a value-fact.  Meriting is thus at the core of affective 
knowledge.   
But, fifth, what about when an emotion is not based on a fact at all, but only on 
what the person took to be a fact?  Since the ground cannot be the fact, what is it?  And 
doesn’t the difficulty of answering this question favor a story on which emotions are 
never based on external facts?  Here we run into a constellation of philosophical 
pressures familiar from the philosophy of perception.  There too an account that posits 
its topic-state as a mode of access to what is ‘out there’ runs up against the fact that 
sometimes its putative object is absent.  But few nowadays would insist on the basis of 
this argument that one only ever really perceives internal items.27  There is a plethora of 
strategies for avoiding this conclusion, as the explosion of disjunctivist responses to the 
 
27 Contemporary skepticism about this style of argument traces back to Austin 1962. 
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argument from illusion shows.28  We will not commit ourselves to any detailed reply to 
the analogous argument here.  But we see no reason why the correct solution to the 
former case could not be extended to the latter.   
 Emotions are especially plausible sources of knowledge of value in light of the 
way they challenge the false division between the cognitive and the conative.  And it is 
precisely in this regard that a theory of the aesthetic that identifies aesthetic judgment 
with emotion—Affectivism—proves itself.  Affectivism illuminates, as we show in the 
next section, the structure of aesthetic experience, its motivating character, and its 
epistemic profile.  
 
III.  Aesthetic Judgment as Feeling   
 
In what follows, we will take for granted that emotions and perceptions differ along the 
lines just sketched.  Now we will show that aesthetic knowledge bottoms out in affective 
states rather than perceptual states.  We will argue that the three characteristics of 
feeling highlighted in section II—rational structure, motivational immediacy, and 
epistemic directness—are precisely what makes the feeling of aesthetic appreciation the 
most plausible source of aesthetic knowledge.  In making this argument, we will rely on 
a distinction between primary and derivative knowledge.  According to the empirical 
model of knowledge, any instance of such knowledge traces back to perception.  We will 
describe those who know that p in virtue of perceiving or having perceived that p as 
 
28 Influential versions of disjunctivism include Hinton (1973) Snowdon (1979), 
McDowell (1987) and. Martin (2002) 
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possessing primary empirical knowledge that p.  Those who have never perceived that p 
have at best derivative empirical knowledge that p.  To have derivative empirical 
knowledge is to have acquired beliefs about the relevant objects without having 
perceived them.29   
In what, then, does primary aesthetic knowledge consist?  Not in perception, we 
argue in this section.  More precisely, we do not possess primary aesthetic knowledge in 
virtue of being in (or having been in) an affectless state.30  This is not to deny that we can 
form aesthetic beliefs without affect, nor to deny that such beliefs can constitute 
 
29 To say that a piece of aesthetic knowledge is primary is to say that its justification has 
not been transmitted by testimony or inference.  But aesthetic justification does not 
operate independently of our being justified in holding other attitudes and so is not 
foundational in Lord’s sense.  Without perceptual knowledge, we would not be in a 
position to respond to the world emotionally.  Our argument here is thus consistent with 
the idea that perception, unlike affect, is a source of foundational knowledge. 
30 We thus explain why Beardsley, like many after him, is wrong to argue that aesthetic 
qualities are “perceptual” in the sense of being “open to direct sensory awareness” 
(Beardsley 1958: 31), or more generally, what’s wrong with “aesthetic empiricism,” the 
view that (in the words of Gregory Curry, who rejects it), “the boundaries of the 
aesthetic are set by the boundaries of vision, hearing or verbal understanding” (An 
Ontology of Art, p. 18). One can also think of the argument in this section as the 
argument that Carroll demands for “demonstrating” that aesthetic experiences (at least 
insofar as they amount to primary aesthetic knowledge) must be affective (Carroll 2012: 
169). 
   
 
 35 
knowledge.  One could acquire this sort of derivative knowledge on the basis of 
testimony.  For example, one could come to believe that a movie is good on the basis of 
reading a favorite critic’s review of the film and one could act on the basis of this belief 
by streaming the film.  But aesthetic knowledge does not originate in a belief, 
perceptually grounded or otherwise.  Such knowledge derives from feeling.  While we 
can know the aesthetic features of objects independently of feeling anything for them, 
aesthetic knowledge derives ultimately from feeling.   
To frame the issue differently: the Perceptualist does not dispute that aesthetic 
knowledge stems ultimately from a direct experience.  Our disagreement concerns the 
nature of this experience.  We use the term ’aesthetic judgment’ for the cognitive state 
that, in the paradigm case, constitutes primary aesthetic knowledge.  The Perceptualist 
holds that this aesthetic judgment is a species of perceptually-grounded belief 
(distinguished from other beliefs by its content); we contend that it is a species of 
affective judgment (distinguished from every belief by its being a kind of feeling). 
  Our defense of Affectivism will revisit the comparison of the previous section, 
using it to show that aesthetic judgments fall into the category of feeling.  Aesthetic 
judgments have rational bases that warrant or fail to warrant and they engage the will as 
such.  Nonetheless, like perceptual judgments, they are a source of primary knowledge.  
 
 
a.  Aesthetic Experiences have a Rational Structure 
 
Aesthetic experience yields knowledge of value facts; specifically, the facts that 
certain objects are to-be-appreciated.  We articulate aesthetic experience by ascribing 
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merit or demerit, voicing approval or disapproval of what we have experienced.  When 
we say “The Souvenir is moving”, we are putting into words an experience through 
which we seem to be in touch with a property of the film in virtue of which it is worthy of 
being appreciated, that is, with a value property.  And we experience the film as being 
moving in light of, e.g., the candid yet expressive acting, the complicated and powerful 
plot, etc., which are themselves value-facts: aspects of the film to-be-appreciated.   
Because an aesthetic judgment is a stance on whether something is to be 
appreciated, the aesthetic experiences that constitute such judgments, unlike 
perceptions, raise a rational “why” question.  This question asks for one’s reasons for 
finding it worthy of appreciation, reasons that in the good case both justify and explain 
one’s aesthetic judgment.  If Mary judges the Souvenir to be an excellent film and is 
asked why she does so, she might appeal to its being moving.  The judgment of 
excellence (in the form of feeling) is justified by appeal to a feature or features of the 
film in virtue of which it merits such a judgment, that is, such a feeling.  Mary might cite 
the fact that the film is moving as rationally explaining her liking for the film; in so 
doing, she portrays this fact as a cause of her liking, one that operates through her 
recognition that this same fact justifies this liking. The film is to-be-appreciated—as 
Mary knows through her appreciation of it—because its being moving confers this status 
upon it.  In giving the explanation, Mary represents her aesthetic judgment as explained 
by a certain aspect of the film, and this explanation operates through her recognition of 
its justifying function: she recognizes it as showing the film to be worthy of appreciation.    
Now consider an ordinary emotion:  If Sal is scared of the approaching man, their 
fear is a presentation of that man’s approach as to-be-feared.  To be afraid is itself an 
evaluative judgment, but one that, unlike belief, takes the form of feeling.  If they are 
   
 
 37 
asked why they fear the man’s approach, Sal might reply that it is because he is a violent 
criminal.  This is an explanation of why they are scared, one that also justifies their fear.  
It is precisely because the emotion itself is a presentation (or a would-be presentation) 
of something as to-be-feared that Sal’s answer—like anyone’s answer to a similar ‘why’ 
question—must cite something that shows (or purports to show) that the object of their 
fear in fact warrants that very feeling.  Sal cites the fact that the approaching man is a 
violent criminal as a way of rationally explaining her fear; in so doing she portrays this 
fact as a rational cause of their fear, one that operates through their recognition of this 
fact as justifying this fear.31  The common rational structure (alien to perceptual states) 
of aesthetic and affective judgment is due to the former being an instance of the latter. 
 
b. Aesthetic Experiences are Intrinsically Motivating   
 
Let us return to valence.  Aesthetic experience, like the emotions, has valence: it 
is experientially charged positively or negatively.32 Some doubt whether aesthetic 
experience must be valanced,33 but we would argue that this is chiefly based on a 
confusion about what valence is.  To be positively (or negatively) valenced, an 
experience need not be a fluffy, warm experience (or its opposite).  A valenced 
experience is an experience with a specific presentational profile;34 it presents one kind 
 
31 For more on rational causes, see Marcus (2012). 
32 E.g., Prinz (2011), Dokic (2016), Nanay (2016), Goffin (2018), Robinson (2020).  
33 E.g., Carroll (1999) and (2004).  
34 E.g., Scheller (1973) and Poellner (2016).  
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of value property and also has a specific motivational structure.35 Positive (or negative) 
valence is not to be understood as a hedonic tone, i.e., in terms of ‘feeling good’ (or 
‘feeling bad’) as that expression is typically used.  This would wrongly exclude the 
possibility that an experience of a work both presents it as excellent and as, in a familiar 
sense, painful to read or watch or listen to (and as painful precisely in the experience of 
the works’ aesthetic virtues).  And it would wrongly suggest that experiences with the 
same valence feel the same.  An aesthetic experience that has a positive valence is felt as 
to-be-sustained insofar as it presents the object as meriting the very feeling one is 
experiencing.  This is sometimes so even when we would describe the work as 
unpleasant or difficult.  Even then, one is conscious not just of one’s pleasure in taking 
in the work, but of the correctness of one’s own pleasurable response to it.   
The valence and presentational character of aesthetic experience are connected in 
the characteristically affective manner: it is through valence that we make contact with 
value.  This is not to say that we infer value from our feeling pleasure, but rather that the 
pleasure (or displeasure) of an aesthetic experience is a presentation of its object’s value, 
and therein a way of coming to know its value.  To see this, consider the corresponding 
claim about perception.  One does not infer from the qualitative character of one’s visual 
experience that the world is laid out a certain way.  Rather, this qualitative character 
constitutes one’s grasp of what characteristics one’s visual experience presents objects 
as possessing.36  Similarly, the affective character of one’s aesthetic experience 
 
35 E.g., Prinz (2011).   
36 Dispositionalist accounts of color go wrong precisely by denying this intuitive idea.  
See Johnston 1992. 
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constitutes one’s grasp of what aesthetic properties such experience presents the objects 
as possessing.  Specifically, it presents an object as worthy of the pleasure (or 
displeasure) that is exemplified by the very experience one is having, and as possessing 
the value that consists partly in meriting such an experience. 
The valenced character of aesthetic experience is a presentation of value that 
possesses an immediate motivational direction in virtue of the specific value presented.  
Mere belief, even belief about value, is not like this.  If one, for example, merely believes 
knowledgeably that the Souvenir is excellent one might nonetheless lack the motivation 
to finish watching it, let alone to re-watch it with commentary and recommend it to 
others.  But feeling as such motivates.  We saw above how emotions such as grief 
standardly motivate by themselves; we can now extend this point to the aesthetic realm. 
To find something beautiful—to make a positive aesthetic judgment—is therein to be 
motivated to continue the relevant experience.  This is another way of putting Kant’s 
characterization of aesthetic judgment as future-directed and self-sustaining.37  To 
appreciate the beauty of the Souvenir means that no additional motivation is needed to 
keep watching it.  This is not to say that one will necessarily act on this motivation—
other sources of motivation may interfere.  But nothing further in the way of motivation 
is needed to continue.   
This is one of the least controversial aspects of Kant’s aesthetics, an aspect of 
aesthetic experience that aestheticians today widely agree upon. We explain this feature. 
Aesthetic judgment is immediately motivating in part because to make such a 
 
37 Kant 2000 [1790]: 107. Cf. Dokic on what he calls the “characteristic motivational 
profile” of aesthetic experience (Dokic 2016), Matthen (2017), and Hopkins (ms.). 
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judgment—i.e., to experience the relevant feeling—is to take the object at stake to merit 
this feeling indefinitely (and often further mental states and actions).  And it is to take in 
the object as valuable by feeling its value.  The same cannot be said of any merely 
perceptual judgment or, more generally, any judgment that is not at the same time an 
affective judgment.  To see that the table is red is not thereby to be motivated to 
continue gazing at.  If aesthetic judgment were perceptual, it could not as such motivate.   
But it does, and this fact helps to establish that aesthetic judgment is affective rather 
than perceptual.  
 
c.  Aesthetic Experience is a Direct Way of Knowing 
 
What we say and do on the basis of our affective experiences support the view 
that they give us cognitive purchase on value properties.  We take it that someone 
undergoing these experiences can discover and learn new things about the objects of 
these experiences through the experiences themselves.  It is often through grieving that 
the significance of a loved one manifests itself to us, and it is the disclosure of this 
significance that explains why we reflect upon the loved one’s life. It is often by feeling 
angry and morally indignant that we make cognitive contact with the corruption of 
someone’s act, and this discovery then explains why we choose to stay away from the 
person or try to explain to him or to others the wrongness of his act.  Similarly, it is 
through our enjoyment of The Souvenir that we discover the film’s aesthetic excellence, 
and it is this experience that explains why we watch the film again with full commentary 
by the director, recommend it to others, and so on. As we mentioned above, we do not 
deny that we can come to learn about those (dis)values in non-affective ways. But feeling 
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these emotions is a paradigmatic way of coming to know these (dis)values, a way of 
knowing to which we often appeal when we are asked: “why do you think the act was 
morally outrageous?” or “why do you take the film to be so good?”  Our ways of thinking 
and acting indicate that we take our feelings, aesthetic and otherwise, to reveal values to 
us.38  
Our claim, then, is that aesthetic knowledge bottoms out in affective experiences. 
Aesthetic pleasure reveals objects as beautiful, which is to say, as meriting the very 
pleasure we experience when, in paradigmatic instances, we take in a beautiful object.  
In the paradigmatic case, appreciation puts one in touch with the object’s beauty.39  This 
is aesthetic knowledge, understood as the perfection of the capacity for appreciation.  
Someone who understands the medium of film and possesses the relevant knowledge 
 
38 Clearly, this is not meant as a complete defense of the presentational power of 
feelings, but along with the responses to the queries above, it suffices for our purposes in 
this paper. For a more detailed defense, see Gorodeisky (MS).  
39 Notice that while Jesse Prinz (2011) also views appreciation as affective, he wrongly 
regards it as non-cognitive (and not as pleasure but as the emotion of wonder). 
Furthermore, our view significantly differs from aesthetic empiricist views of 
appreciation such as Iseminger’s (2004): on our view, appreciation is directed at and 
presents not itself as finally valuable (as Iseminger has it) but the appreciated object as 
meriting appreciation. Our view is thus not empiricist: it is not committed to the claim 
that aesthetic value is the value of its appreciation. Furthermore, since Carroll (2012) 
understands both what he calls the affective approach and the valuing approach as 
empiricist, his criticisms of both views miss ours.  
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can exercise her understanding (and other relevant cognitive powers) in an enjoyment 
of the film, one that is derived in part from an enjoyment of the features of the film that 
make it—a film of this sort—worth enjoying.  Her knowledge of its excellence consists in 
this pleasure.  She has primary aesthetic knowledge, knowledge whose form is aesthetic.  
But since beauty is part of the fabric of reality, it is also among possible objects of belief, 
an affectless state.  Someone with primary aesthetic knowledge of a film can 
communicate her own aesthetic appreciation of the film to another, who might then 
have derivative aesthetic knowledge.  This knowledge is a species of belief and is 
aesthetic in virtue of its content.   
 Before we move on, a note on the role of pleasure in our argument. Our goal in 
this paper is to argue that primary aesthetic knowledge is constituted by feeling rather 
than perception.  Throughout our discussion in this section, we have focused on 
pleasure.  More would have to be said to locate pleasure definitively in a taxonomy of 
aesthetic feeling (for that, see Gorodeisky 2021(a), Gorodeisky MS).  But here is the 
basic idea: pleasure, we would argue, is not so much a state as it is a class of states.  A 
pleasure is a felt endorsement.  The pleasure of sipping a hot toddy on this chilly 
December day is a felt approving apprehension of the drink as meriting such a felt 
approval; the pleasure of dancing to “Stupid Horse” is an approving apprehension of the 
song’s groove, the pleasure of reading a good book to one’s child is an approving 
apprehension of the value of this engagement, one’s enjoyment of The Souvenir is an 
approving apprehension of the film as excellent, etc.  These are all instances of pleasure, 
though they are not the same feeling.   
It is quite uncontroversial (throughout the history of philosophy and up to the 
present day) that pleasure has a particular motivational structure: it is self-maintaining.  
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And so, given that it is a self-maintaining and (as we have now argued) direct 
presentation of normative fact, it satisfies the criteria for the fundamental aesthetic 
knowledge-state: it has the same rational structure, epistemic profile, and motivating 
power that we have shown aesthetic experience and judgment to have.  
We now turn to the Paradox of Aesthetic Criticism.40 
 
IV.  The Paradox of Aesthetic Criticism Redux 
 
The point of this paper is to argue for Affectivism, the view that aesthetic 
knowledge bottoms out in feeling.  Our strategy has been to demonstrate its superiority 
in this regard over Perceptualism, the view that the source of aesthetic knowledge is 
perception.  To this end, we employ an argument from explanatory fruits.  Affectivism, 
unlike Perceptualism, yields an explanation of how to reconcile Directness with 
Criticism.  In so doing, it illuminates a wide swath of core aesthetic phenomena—the 
structure of aesthetic experience, its motivating character, and its epistemic profile—and 
the connections between them.  In this final section, we show exactly how Affectivism 
resolves the Paradox of Aesthetic Criticism. 
Recall first that the Paradox arises from the seeming conflict between  
 
40 We have shown elsewhere (Gorodeisky and Marcus 2018) that this distinction is also 
crucial for solving another puzzle that has bedeviled aestheticians since at least Kant: 
how to reconcile the (at least seemingly) first-personal nature of aesthetic judgment (its 
independence of the judgments of others) with our rationally doubting such judgments 
they conflict with that of qualified judges. 
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Directness: Direct experience is the only source of aesthetic 
knowledge,  
and 
Criticism:  Aesthetic criticism is, in virtue of its rational character, a 
source of aesthetic knowledge.   
How, then, does Affectivism resolve the Paradox?  Like so: Affectivism is the view that 
aesthetic knowledge is (affective) appreciation. Feeling, in contrast to perception, has a 
rational structure.  The rationality of aesthetic criticism thus helps to confirm our 
approach.  Since aesthetic knowledge is a feeling with a rational structure, it is natural 
that writings about the aesthetic take the form of making that structure explicit.  The 
reasoning of the critic is of a perfectly familiar sort, the sort we engage every day, for 
example, when we dispute that the loss of the Tigers is worthy of grief; when we explain 
why we are disappointed by a student, angry at a colleague, or moved by The Souvenir. 
Criticism is the articulation of one subspecies of emotional rationality.  That criticism 
articulates the critic’s aesthetic knowledge is puzzling only if one has somehow fallen out 
of touch with this familiar phenomenon and so with the affective nature of aesthetic 
knowledge.  Our view predicts and explains the nature of criticism straightforwardly and 
elegantly without forcing it where it doesn’t fit: in perception.    
 This takes care of Criticism, but what about Directness?  We are still left with 
the puzzle of how criticism could be the source of its audience’s aesthetic knowledge 
given that, per Directness, the source of aesthetic knowledge is direct experience.  The 
affective account of aesthetic knowledge does not seem to help here, since one cannot 
feel what is to be felt merely by taking the word of someone else that such a feeling is 
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merited.  The core of our solution is a distinction between the nature of the relation that 
the critic stands in to her own reasons and the relation that the audience stands in to 
those same reasons.  A critic’s aesthetic judgment that The Souvenir is excellent is 
derived, say, from her being moved by its perceptive portrait of a talented and ambitious 
student falling under the sway of a manipulative, sophisticated, penurious, and 
mysteriously charismatic older man.  But simply imbibing the critic’s words does not 
justify any aesthetic judgment on the part of a reader who has yet to see the film, for she 
is not yet in a position to make an aesthetic judgment about the film.  So what does 
criticism do for the reader?  
Two things.  First, as Sibley held, and both Lord and Hopkins emphasize, critics 
guide their readers’ aesthetic experience.  But only Affectivism can account for how 
critics do this by virtue of the rational character of criticism.  For example, suppose 
upon first viewing the film, we failed to notice just how blind the Souvenir’s heroine is to 
her lover’s manipulations.  We might then come to appreciate the film better after 
reading Anthony Lane’s invocation of Henry James: “we pay more for some kinds of 
knowledge than those particular kinds are worth” (Lane, 2014).  This remark might alert 
us to what Julie, the heroine, does not know, and in some sense chooses not to know.  
We might then become concerned about her willful blindness.  We might also come to 
recognize our own anxiety on her behalf as crucial to the film’s aesthetic achievement.  
In other words, if we watch the film with these critical remarks in mind, then the critic’s 
reason, which initially served merely as a guide to appreciation, becomes a reason for 
our own aesthetic judgment: we can now appreciate the film for the reasons that it is 
appreciation-worthy. We come to appreciate the power of the film by being concerned 
about Julie and moved by her innocence, her ambition, and the way the former 
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undermines the latter.  In the ideal case, a critic’s reason becomes a reader’s reason: not 
by testimony, but by leading the reader to a more attuned engagement with the work, 
thereby allowing her to experience this reason for herself as supporting appreciation.   
Second, even apart from any such engagement, the critic’s reasoning can also 
function as testimony in support of an ordinary belief that the film has the qualities that 
the critic describes.  Criticism could thus also be the source of the audience’s merely 
derivative aesthetic knowledge, the source of their justified belief that the relevant work 
is excellent or poor in the manner specified by the critic.  Such derivative knowledge is 
often what leads us to go to the movies following a favorable review.   
Putting these two points together:  Criticism is a source of its audience’s 
derivative aesthetic knowledge.  But, more importantly, it also helps audiences acquire 
primary aesthetic knowledge by rationally guiding their own appreciative responses.  
Critics model primary aesthetic knowledge; they are our appreciative mirrors, showing 
us how to take in a work so as appreciate its beauty.  Criticism is thus, via testimony, the 
epistemic source of derivative aesthetic knowledge.  It is, via guidance, the causal or 
guiding source of primary aesthetic knowledge.41 But Directness concerns the epistemic 
source of primary aesthetic knowledge.  Thus, we arrive at a satisfactory reconciliation 
of Criticism and Directness, one that neither obliterates the rationality of aesthetic 
experience nor makes a mystery of its intrinsically motivating character.    
Here are our two principles again, now refined so as to reveal their consistency:  
 
41 By ‘causal’, we do not mean ‘mechanistic’.  The point is simply that criticism leads one, 
in the ordinary sense, to experiences that constitute aesthetic knowledge. 
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Directness*: Direct experience is the only source of primary aesthetic 
knowledge.  
Criticism*: Aesthetic criticism is, in virtue of its rational character, a 
guide to obtaining primary aesthetic knowledge.  It is also a testimonial 
source of derivative aesthetic knowledge.  
It might be objected that Afffectivism is not as well-positioned as Perceptualism 
to account for the truth of Directness* given that a perception of p is necessarily the 
product of direct contact with p, whereas we are capable of emotionally responding to an 
object without any direct contact.  But to account for Directness* we do not need to 
show that feelings typically arise from direct contact or even that affective knowledge 
generally bottoms out in direct contact, as empirical knowledge does with perception.  
We just need to show that aesthetic experience is a direct way of acquiring knowledge.  
Given that aesthetic experience is affective experience, there is no mystery about how 
direct aesthetic knowledge is possible.  This result fits into the large aims of the paper 
like so:  If not for the introduction of Affectivism, only Perceptualism would be able to 
account for Directness.  But since Perceptualism cannot account for Criticism, there 
would then be no way to resolve The Paradox of Aesthetic Criticism.   
 Finally, another dimension of the rationality of criticism bears mention.  Above, 
we noted that it is common to find oneself stymied in attempting to articulate one’s 
aesthetic reactions.  Sometimes, this is simply because our judgment has no rational 
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ground.  I just, e.g., find a certain shade of blue beautiful.42  Often, however, there is a 
reason for one’s response but one cannot put one’s finger on it.  Its presence is inchoate 
in one’s experience.  Good criticism can help us articulate our experience of the work.  In 
this way, a good critic contributes to our own self-understanding.  This too is an aspect 
of the rational character of criticism.  The best art touches us deeply, and the best 
criticism enables us to bring the way it moves us more fully to consciousness. 
 
 V. Conclusion  
 
Some hold that our approach cherry-picks the data, emphasizing those acts and 
activities to which feeling is essential while ignoring everything else.43  The judgments 
 
42 Someone might think that this shows aesthetic judgments need not be rational after 
all, but that is not so.  To make this judgment is to experience the color as to-be-
appreciated.  As such, the question: “Why do you find it beautiful?” has application.  But 
one way of showing it to have application is to say: “No reason, I just like it; that’s all.” 
Our view thus does not require that, in every case, one’s feelings have a rational cause.  
Cf., Anscombe on the distinctive ‘Why?’ question that marks intentional action: “Now of 
course a possible answer to the question ‘Why?’ is one like ‘I just thought I would’ or ‘It 
was an impulse’ or ‘For no particular reason’....The question is not refused application 
because the answer to it says that there is no reason, any more than the question how 
much money I have in my pocket is refused application by the answer ‘None’” 
(Anscombe 2000: 25). 
43 Robbie Kubala in a review of our Gorodeisky and Marcus (2018).  
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and activities of curators, art historians, preservationists, art educators, after all, often 
do not involve feeling (of pleasure) in any direct way.  We contend, nonetheless, that the 
view defended here is the only one that can make sense of the full range of the practices 
that are built up around the aesthetic dimensions of human life.  Independently of the 
appreciation that aesthetic value merits, and through which it is revealed, none of these 
practices would be intelligible as aesthetic practices, nor, for that matter would they 
make sense as human activities more generally.  There would be no reasons to exhibit a 
painting or preserve a building on account of its aesthetic value if there were no reasons 
to appreciate the painting or the building.  The distinctive sort of pleasure that we take 
in beautiful things thus grounds the activities of the curator, historian, and others.  This 
is not to suggest that the point of these practices is to feel pleasure, as if we go to see The 
Souvenir again for the same sort of reason that a raver takes another hit of ecstasy.  No: 
we engage in these practices because of the excellence of aesthetically valuable things, 
excellence that merits and is fundamentally known through a certain kind of pleasure. 
Appreciation, then, is the key to the aesthetic.  It is through appreciation that aesthetic 
value is, in the first instance, known.  And it is in virtue of this pleasurable engagement 
with value that it occupies a vital role in our lives.44      
 
44 This article evolved from our response to comments on Gorodeisky and Marcus (2018) 
by Robbie Kubala and Aaron Meskin at the 2020 Eastern Division Meeting of the APA. 
We thank Kubala and Meskin for those comments, and are grateful to Arata Hamawaki 
for conversations that helped to inspire this article. We also extend our thanks to Ram 
Neta and James Shelley, to anonymous reviewers of this journal, and to audiences at an 





“Aesthetic Epistemology Workshop” at the University of Georgia and at a meeting of the 
“Ethics Seminar” at Boston University. 
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